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Abstract. Spinoza’s account of memory has not received enough 
attention, even though it is relevant for his theory of consciousness. Recent 
literature has studied the “pancreas problem.” This paper argues that there is 
an analogous problem for memories: if memories are in the mind, why is the 
mind not conscious of them? I argue that Spinoza’s account of memory can 
be better reconstructed in the context of Descartes’s account to show that 
Spinoza responded to these views. Descartes accounted for the preservation 
of memories by holding that they are brain states without corresponding 
mental states, and that the mind is able to interpret perception either as new 
experience or as memory. Spinoza has none of these conceptual resources 
because of his substance monism. Spinoza accounts for memories as the 
mind’s ability to generate ideas according to the order of images. This ability 
consists in the connection of ideas, which is not an actual property, but only a 
dispositional one and thus not conscious. It is, however, grounded in the 
actual property of parts of the body, of which ideas are conscious. 
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Spinoza’s account of memory as a mental capacity is rarely discussed, which is 
surprising given the central role memory plays in Spinoza’s philosophical project.1 
This is even more surprising given that the way Spinoza accounts for memories has 
serious ramifications for his account of consciousness, which has recently received a 
lot of attention.2 In the discussion of the “pancreas problem,” scholars have struggled 
to provide a reconstruction of Spinoza’s account of consciousness. On the one hand, 
Spinoza concludes on the basis of his monism that everything that happens in the 
body is represented in the mind in the form of an idea.3 On the other hand, he says 
that everything that is an idea is “animated.”4 Moreover, he does not provide an 
account of selective consciousness – i.e., he does not distinguish conscious and non-
conscious ideas. The problem discussed in the pancreas debate is therefore: How can 
the apparent fact that states or events in the body – for instance, the working of the 
pancreas – are not always consciously experienced be reconciled with Spinoza’s 
philosophy of mind?5 However, the question can also be turned around: Can states or 
events in the mind be such that they are not always consciously experienced? An 
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obvious example is memories, which seem to be in the mind, yet memories that are 
not currently being entertained are not experienced consciously. How Spinoza 
answers this question is the topic of this paper. 
In the history of philosophy many theories of memory have been formulated, 
which, following Michaelian and Sutton, can be grouped roughly into two large 
camps, namely, the preservationist and generationist views.6 According to a standard 
preservationist view, the mind has access to some kind of “storehouse” where 
memories are retained and from which they can be retrieved when necessary. On this 
view, memories not currently being entertained are actual states or events that 
represent a past occurrence, even when the occurrence is not actively remembered. In 
contrast, the standard generationist view holds that acquiring memories is similar to a 
learning process through which the mind acquires the ability to form actual states or 
events that represent a past occurrence. On this view, memories are potential or 
dispositional states that do not themselves represent the past occurrence but are able 
to generate a representation of it when the need arises. While there are more refined 
versions of these views and many middle positions, it seems that Spinoza’s position is 
not compatible with either of these camps. He cannot join the preservationist camp 
because of his adherence to the doctrine of transparency of the mind, and he cannot 
endorse a generationist view because of his rejection of never-actualized dispositions. 
As I will show in section 1, Spinoza makes repeated claims about memories, 
which shows that he felt the need to provide an account of memory. This is 
significant because in the case of the pancreas problem it is a legitimate worry that 
Spinoza might not have been interested in the conscious nature of our ideas of the 
working of the pancreas. However, the fact that he discussed memory raises the 
question: What type of account of memory did Spinoza actually provide, and how 
compatible is it with other claims in his philosophy of mind? As I will argue in section 
2, his account cannot be a straightforward generationist or preservationist account 
because of the above-mentioned difficulties. In section 3, I present Descartes’s 
account of corporeal and intellectual memory. I argue in section 4 that by comparing 
Spinoza’s account of memory with Descartes’s account of corporeal and intellectual 
memory, a more nuanced view can be found. In section 5, I argue for my revised 
generationist interpretation. This account accomplishes three things: it accounts 
separately for phenomena that Descartes discussed under the labels “corporeal 
memory” and “intellectual memory,” it clarifies the status of non-entertained 
memories in conscious experience, and it upholds Spinoza’s strict metaphysical 
monism.  
But before that, some terminological clarification is needed. First, I will use 
“state,” “property,” and “event” interchangeably for what Spinoza calls “mode.” 
There is no way to distinguish these in Spinoza’s metaphysics. However, it would be 
odd to say that there is an event of “breaking ten years from now” in the event 
“glass,” just as it would be odd to say that the subject has the property of “his 
pancreas working.” In both cases Spinoza would say that one mode inheres in 
another.7 Second, I will use “disposition,” “never-actualized disposition,” “non-
actualized disposition,” and “actual property” in the following way: I call “actual 
property” a non-dispositional property of an object – for example, the property of 
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being made of porcelain. I call “disposition” a property by virtue of which it is 
possible for an object to acquire an actual property; for example, by virtue of the 
disposition “fragile” it is possible for an object to have the actual property of breaking. 
Finally, I call “never-actualized disposition” a disposition that is never actualized, such 
as, for example, the fragility of a glass that never breaks. By contrast, a “non-actualized 
disposition” is a disposition currently not actualized, such as the fragility of a glass 
today that is going to break tomorrow. 
 
1. Spinoza’s account of memory in the Ethics 
The most important passage in the Ethics8 where Spinoza discusses memory 
and recollection is E2p18. The fact that the scholium to this proposition is cited in 
E5p21 as the definition of memory shows that Spinoza also considered this passage to 
be the place where he gives his account of the working of memory. I quote the 
passage in full: 
 
If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at 
the same time, then when the mind subsequently imagines one of 
them, it will immediately recollect the others also. 
Dem.: The mind (by P17C) imagines a body because the human body 
is affected and disposed by an external body’s impressions (vestigiis) as 
it was affected when certain of its parts were struck by the external 
body itself.9 But (by hypothesis) the body was then so disposed that 
the mind imagined two [or more] bodies at once; therefore it will 
now also imagine two [or more] at once, and when the mind imagines 
one, it will immediately recollect the other also, q.e.d. 
Schol.: From this we clearly understand what memory is. For it is 
nothing other than a certain connection of ideas involving the nature 
of things which are outside the human body – a connection which is 
in the mind according to the order and connection of the affections 
of the human body […]. 
 
Here memory is defined as a special case of imagination. Imagination, as 
Spinoza has defined it in E2p17, is a special way in which the mind forms ideas when 
an external body causes the human body to change its state. For example, the rays of 
light refracted on the surface of an apple cause the back of the eye to have a corporeal 
representation of the apple; this change of state is the bodily image of the apple, which 
is perceived by the mind in the form of an imaginative idea of the apple. The other 
way of forming ideas is intellection, in which case the mind forms an idea from its 
own conceptual resources without depending on external causes.10 The statement that 
memory is a form of imagination therefore amounts to the claim that memories are 
ideas in the mind brought about by external causes. Of course, this leaves open the 
question of what distinguishes memories from other types of imagination: for 
example, what is the difference between the memory of an apple and the perception 
of that apple? 
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In order to clarify his account, Spinoza presents in the scholium two examples 
of the working of memory. The first is the use of language: when the human mind 
thinks the idea of a word (e.g., the Latin word pomum) the mind almost automatically 
thinks also the idea of the meaning of the word (e.g., the image of an apple). The 
second example concerns the different associations to which the same visual 
experience can give rise: when seeing traces of a horse, different people with different 
personal histories might think of either a warhorse or a draft horse. Both examples are 
intended to highlight the arbitrary nature of memories (as opposed to the rational 
connection between intellectual ideas): the connection established in memory between 
a word and its meaning is conventional,11 whereas the connection between a trace and 
a thought image depends on the form of life of the given subject.12 That is, just 
because one idea reminds the subject of another idea does not mean that there is a 
logical connection between these ideas. (I will offer a more detailed analysis of these 
examples in section 4 below.) 
Spinoza uses memory as an explanans in his theory of affects. He establishes 
that affects can be remembered together (E3p14, E3p52), citing E2p18. Furthermore, 
the memory of one thing can reduce the appetite for something else (E3p2s); the 
memory of a hated but destroyed object still causes sadness (E3p47s); the mind strives 
to recollect things that destroy a hated or fearsome thing (E3p13); longing is a desire 
encouraged by the memory of some objects and restrained by the memory of others 
(E3p36, E3defaff32). Finally, the memory of a recent event has a more powerful grip 
on our mind than the memory of a distant event (E4p10). 
Spinoza also uses recollection as an explanans when he gives his account of the 
formation of universal notions (E2p40s1). On his view, we form the universal notion 
of human being because we have encountered many people and formed an image – 
i.e., a memory – of each of them. However, we soon reach the limits of our capacity 
to remember each of them distinctly, so we start blurring these images together. In 
these blurred – i.e., confused and obscure – images, the characteristics shared by many 
particular images are more visible, while those shared by fewer images are less easily 
recognized. Since these universal notions are blurred ideas of no single image in 
particular,13 memory features in the definition of the first kind of knowledge as one 
possible source of error (E2p40s2). 
Similarly, recollection is mentioned in the explanation of the generation of 
modal terms (E2p44s, E3p2s). Here Spinoza claims that always having certain ideas 
together gives rise to the idea of necessity, while having ideas sometimes together and 
sometimes independently gives rise to the idea of contingency. The latter modal term 
plays a role in his theory of affects as well (E4p13). These epistemically suspect roles 
of memory notwithstanding, memory can play a constructive role as well: in E5p10s 
Spinoza advises us to memorize specific maxims which we can use when scientific 
knowledge is in practice unattainable. 
 
2. Why is Spinoza’s account of memory problematic? 
As I will argue in this section, among Spinoza’s statements about memory, 
some seem to support a preservationist reading, others a generationist one. A 
straightforward preservationist reading, however, is ruled out by his notion of 
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consciousness: for if everything that happens in the body is conscious, it is not clear 
how memory traces could be in the brain without the mind being aware of them. The 
generationist approach does not have this problem, but it is ruled out by Spinoza’s 
metaphysical commitments: for if everything possible has to be actual at some time, it 
is not clear how Spinoza can allow dispositions for forming certain memory pictures. 
What seems to speak in favor of a preservationist reading is the way Spinoza 
explains what memory is and how it is relevant for other aspects of his philosophy. 
The role of images (E2p40s1, E5p23), as well as of “impressions or traces” (E3post2; 
cf. E2p18d) seems to point in the preservationist direction. It seems that there is an 
actual (i.e., non-dispositional) bodily state in the form of an image or memory trace in 
the brain that represents the past occurrence, even if it is not remembered. 
At the same time, the emphasis on the association and formation of ideas 
seems to point to the generationist reading. In many passages (E2p18, E2p44s E3p2s, 
E3p14, E3p52) Spinoza treats memory as the mind’s ability to form certain ideas 
when appropriate external stimuli are present. Memory seems to be a special case of 
the association of ideas, when certain ideas acquire a habit of being formed together, 
and this habit is not grounded in the representational content of the ideas.14 For 
example, if the mind is able to form the idea of “Peter every day at noon” because 
Peter has often been seen at noon, then the mind has a memory of Peter at noon. 
Thus, it seems that memory is not a preserved representation, but rather the way in 
which the mind responds to certain external stimuli. 
However, both of these options face considerable difficulties. A generationist 
reading would have to explain how this ability to generate ideas could fit into 
Spinoza’s metaphysical picture. Spinoza is committed to the view that everything 
actual is necessary in some sense (E1p33s1, E2p44). On the basis of this, some 
authors have inferred that Spinoza is a necessitarian, i.e., that he holds that the actual 
world is the only possible world.15 But it might instead be the case that he uses a 
different, statistical modal concept that can accommodate the claim that there are 
possible worlds that are necessarily non-actualized; such a position would allow for 
true counterfactual statements.16 Whatever Spinoza’s favorite modal logic might be,17 
it seems to be undisputed that Spinoza does not allow for never-actualized 
possibilities; rather, everything that is possible has to be actual at some point in the 
history of the universe (E1p17c2s).18 
One intuitive way to understand non-actualized dispositions is in terms of 
possibilities. For example, the fragility of a porcelain cup – i.e., the cup’s capacity to 
break – is grounded in the possibility of it breaking. That is, when we say that a cup is 
fragile, we attribute to an actual cup the possibility of acquiring the actual property of 
breaking. It is a matter of debate whether this possibility is understood metaphysically 
in terms of possible worlds, or in terms of formal essences in the infinite intellect, or 
in terms of epistemically unreliable imaginations,19 but none of these options can 
make sense of a disposition without referring to a possibility.20 However, if there are 
no possibilities that are never actualized, then only cups that actually break have the 
capacity to break – i.e., there are no never-actualized dispositions, only non-actualized 
dispositions. This would have odd consequences: for example, if two people had 
identical memory traces in their brains, but only one of them actually recalled the 
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memory during her lifetime, Spinoza would have to say that the other did not have the 
memory, even though her brain state was identical. 
But even if Spinoza were ready to bite the bullet and embrace this 
counterintuitive consequence, there is a further problem with this interpretation. The 
capacity of the cup to break depends on two actual properties: on the one hand its 
actually breaking, and on the other the actual way in which its material is constituted. 
It is not enough for the cup to have the property that it is going to break ten years 
from now for it to have the capacity to break now. This property of “breaking ten 
years from now” has to be grounded in the current property of having a specific 
material constitution, such as being made of porcelain: the property of being made of 
porcelain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a cup to have the capacity to 
break, since on this construal a cup that never breaks does not have the capacity to 
break.21 This means, however, that there must be a similar actual property in the case 
of the human body – presumably the traces or impressions mentioned in E2p18d – 
that grounds the ability to remember in the same way that the property of being made 
of porcelain grounds the fragility of the cup. That is, just as the disposition “fragile” is 
reducible to the property “being made of porcelain” together with the event “breaking 
ten years from now,” the disposition “being able to remember” seems to be reducible 
to the property “having memory traces in the brain” together with the event “recalling 
the memory ten years from now.” 
To sum up, a generationist view seems to work better as an account of 
memory that is compatible with Spinoza’s account of consciousness. For since it does 
not involve actual representations in the body, problems of the consciousness of the 
ideas of these traces seem not to arise. However, without postulating actual properties 
in the body, no generationist account can be provided if Spinoza’s metaphysics is 
interpreted in such a way that it does not allow for dispositions that are irreducible to 
actual properties. 
This leads us to the preservationist account. As we have seen, the 
generationist account implies acquiring an actual property (“having memory traces in 
the brain”) no less than the preservationist account does. Because of this assumed 
actual property in the body, both the preservationist and the generationist readings 
face the difficulty that it is not clear whether the body can acquire actual properties 
without the mind constantly being aware of them. Spinoza states in E2p12 that 
“nothing can happen in [the human] body which is not perceived by the mind.” Yet 
whether one is speaking of actual representations (on the preservationist reading) or 
of the actual grounds of the ability to remember (on the generationist reading), both 
will be properties of the body. Acquiring either property is a change in the body, 
which the mind is then supposed to be perceiving. Non-entertained memories, 
however, by definition do not feature in the stream of consciousness of the subject. 
That is, the generationist reconstruction does not fare better in this respect: the fact 
that the ability is non-actualized does not help in accounting for non-entertained 
memories, if the ability is grounded in an additional property that now has to be 
accounted for. The problem whether the body can have actual properties without 
perceiving them is the famous problem that became known as the “pancreas 
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problem” in the literature, where it is asked whether the working of the pancreas is 
supposed to be conscious, given Spinoza’s claim in E2p12. 
One way to address the problem is to say that the problem simply does not 
exist.22 The most sophisticated version of this answer is provided by Ursula Renz, who 
argues that the argumentative order of the Ethics should not be ignored. In the Ethics, 
Spinoza first defines the mind as the idea of something (E2p11) and then states that 
the object of that idea is the human body (E2p13). This means that when Spinoza 
formulates the above-mentioned claim in E2p12, it has not yet been stated that the 
object of the idea that constitutes the human mind is the human body. From this 
Renz infers that Spinoza does not use the term “human body” in its everyday sense, 
but in a technical sense: what the human body is, is defined by the human mind. It is 
not the case that the human body is a given, and whatever is in its idea is the human 
mind; rather, it is the human mind that is a given, and whatever is its intentional object 
is the human body. Renz’s example is a surgeon whose tools can become part of the 
intentional object of her mind and thus part of her body. Her claim is that normally 
the pancreas is not part of the intentional object of the human mind, and therefore it 
is not in the human body in Spinoza’s technical sense. Thus, E2p12 does not concern 
the pancreas, and the pancreas problem does not arise.23 
This is a solution that might be successful concerning the pancreas; in the 
case of memories, however, it does not work. This is because memories are in the 
mind in the sense that the subject can deliberately recall them (and they do not just 
spontaneously emerge, as perceptions do). However, the subject is not aware of them, 
since our memories are clearly not part of our conscious experience all the time. 
Renz’s interpretation thus faces a dilemma: either memories – or the actual properties 
that ground the ability to generate memories – are not in the mind, in which case they 
are not really memories (or abilities) of the subject; or, if they are in the mind, they are 
conscious all the time, which clearly is contrary to our everyday experience. 
One way in which Renz could defend her account is by maintaining that 
memories are not really in the mind. She could claim that they are outside the mind, 
but stand in an appropriate relation to the mind, and therefore can cause 
representations of past occasions in the mind when the need arises.24 However, this 
solution raises the problem that if this representation is caused by something outside 
the mind, the mind has to have the ability to identify this representation as a memory, 
as opposed to a perception. Since memory is a kind of imagination and therefore falls 
into the same category as perceptions, the mind has to have an additional idea by 
which it can distinguish memories from perceptions. However, either this idea is in 
the mind, in which case the same problem can be raised; or it too is outside the mind, 
in which case there will be an infinite regress. As we will see in the next section, the 
same problem was raised by Descartes, and for him the regress is blocked by 
intellectual memory. 
To sum up, we have surveyed three possible interpretations of Spinoza’s 
account of memory, none of which works as it stands. (1) The first option is that non-
entertained memories can be actual properties in the body that represent past 
occurrences. In this case the question arises: Why is the subject not aware of these 
properties all the time? Alternatively, non-entertained memories could also be abilities 
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to form representations when recalled. In this case, however, the ability has to be 
grounded in either (2) an actual property of the body, or (3) a cause external to the 
body. In the case of the second option (2), the same question arises: Why is the 
subject not aware of this property all the time? In the case of the third option (3), the 
problem is that there must be a criterion for distinguishing perceptions from 
memories. This criterion is either internal to the subject, in which case it has to be 
grounded in an actual property of the body, and the same problem about awareness of 
this property arises; or it is external to the subject, in which case there will be an 
infinite regress. 
 
3. Descartes’s account of corporeal and intellectual memory 
I propose to approach Spinoza’s theory of memory from Descartes’s account, 
which I claim can help us to solve the above-mentioned difficulties, since it is well 
known that Spinoza’s main source and influence was Descartes’s philosophy,25 and his 
philosophy was conceived as a secularized development of the Cartesian philosophical 
project.26 
Descartes distinguishes between what he calls corporeal memory and 
intellectual memory. His theory of corporeal memory remained fairly consistent 
throughout his career and is much easier to make sense of than his account of 
intellectual memory.27 In his Treatise on Man28 Descartes explains corporeal memory as 
follows: when we have some perception, the pores or gaps at the end of the neural 
fibers in the brain are enlarged by the animal spirits, and in this way the brain tissue 
becomes disposed to produce the same movement of animal spirits even in the 
absence of external stimulus.29 Thus, a memory is a pattern in the brain tissue where 
the neural fibers end. When the animal spirits flow through the brain tissue that is 
thus patterned the human mind remembers the idea it had when the pattern was 
formed. Similarly, in the Discourse on the Method memory is a corporeal function – that 
is, it is a part of the corporeal imagination which the mind can use to recollect past 
images.30 In his letters, Descartes states that the number of folds in the brain tissue 
limits the number of memories the brain can retain.31 Moreover, we remember those 
things that we encounter often, not those things that we did when we were very 
young.32 Our experiences as infants, as well as some of our dreams, are relatively 
unique, which explains why we do not remember what we were thinking during 
dreamless sleep33 or infancy.34  
In The Passions of the Soul, Descartes recounts that when recollecting 
something, the human mind directs the pineal gland so that animal spirits flow in 
every direction in search of the specific trace in the brain; when the trace is found the 
idea is recollected.35 Since memory is corporeal, it can serve to explain unconscious 
drives and preferences. For example, the image of cat might have been linked with the 
passion of fear in childhood, and this link can persist in the brain tissue, causing fear 
whenever the subject sees a cat. In this case, the cause of fear is not conscious to the 
subject, who might even conclude that the cat is a fearsome animal.36 
In his letters, Descartes is happy to embrace the idea that memory is a 
corporeal modification of the neural fibers, not only in the brain but also in other 
parts of the body; for example, a flute player’s memory of flute playing is in his hand.37 
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In the Principles of Philosophy, memory is a possible source of error: since we retain 
images in memory even after the actual state of affairs has changed, we might assent 
to ideas that were previously veridical but are no longer.38 
From these remarks we can infer that Descartes discusses a number of 
phenomena in terms of corporeal memory. Most importantly, he uses corporeal 
memory to account for both the retention of past experiences (i.e., the generation of 
token ideas) and habituation (i.e., the generation of a type of idea when another type 
of idea is present). In the case of retention, his account seems to combine 
preservationist and generationist elements: the folds in the brain retain an actual 
corporeal image (note the metaphor of the pineal gland “searching” for the memory, 
as if in a storeroom, by directing the flow of animal spirits) which might or might not 
on its own represent the past occurrence.39 This brain state, however, generates a 
mental state only when the appropriate situation arises. The appropriate situation 
involves the animal spirits flowing through the corporeal image, but having a mental 
state cannot consist simply in this, since we do not experience flashing images of past 
occurrences before successfully recalling the right memory, as the above-mentioned 
metaphor of a “cerebral search engine” would suggest.40 In the case of habituation, his 
account seems to be a straightforwardly generationist one: the particular nerves 
acquire a disposition to be opened together, which constitutes an ability of the mind 
to form particular representations when certain ideas are entertained. As we will see 
shortly, this purely generationist account has the problem that it has to account for the 
mind’s ability to identify particular recollections as instances of memory, as opposed 
to instances of new experience. 
In addition to corporeal memory, Descartes accepts intellectual memory, but 
his account of it is far less developed and far less easy to make sense of.41 A first 
difficulty concerns the term itself, which can mean either of two things: memory that 
belongs to the intellect, or memory of which the objects are intellectual. The first 
option could itself amount to two different claims: (1) that intellectual memory is a 
memory belonging to the thinking thing, and thus peculiar to humans; or (2) that 
intellectual memory belongs to the thinking thing insofar as it is independent of the 
body. (Note that the second claim entails the first one, but not the other way 
around.42) Both claims are supported by explicit claims made by Descartes: (1) that 
intellectual memory belongs only to humans (who are special because they are both 
thinking and extended things),43 and (2) that it is independent of the folds in the 
brain.44 The second option would amount to a third claim (3) that intellectual memory 
is about objects that can be known without using the body – for example, the 
intelligible triangle as opposed to the imagined shape of a triangle,45 universals,46 and 
logical axioms.47 
If we take a look at the problems where Descartes treats intellectual memory 
as an explanans, the picture becomes even more complicated. One problem that clearly 
requires intellectual memory is the resurrection of the dead.48 Descartes claims that 
with the help of intellectual memory the resurrected will be able to remember past 
occurrences, and it is implied that they will be able to identify their loved ones. 
However, since he does not elaborate on whether the resurrected will be purely 
spiritual beings or will have glorified bodies (the brains of which could host memory 
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traces),49 and since he does not explain how intellectual memory of particular bodies is 
possible, one can only second Clarke’s conclusion that Descartes is adopting a 
traditional religious view without sufficient philosophical underpinnings.50 
More interestingly, Descartes states that intellectual memory links the sound 
or shape of a word to its cognitive meaning.51 Note that in the Second Set of Replies, 
Descartes uses the same example in order to illustrate what it means to have an idea.52 
He also argues in a letter to Arnauld that intellectual memory is necessary in order to 
identify the occurrence of a perception as either a new perception or the recollection 
of a past experience: 
 
From this it is clear that it is not sufficient for memory that there 
should be traces left in the brain by preceding thoughts. The traces 
have to be of such a kind that the mind recognizes that they have not 
always been present in us, but were at some time newly impressed. 
Now for the mind to recognize this, I think that when these traces 
were first made it must have made use of pure intellect to notice that 
the thing which was then presented to it was new and had not been 
presented before; for there cannot be any corporeal trace of this 
novelty.53 
 
Descartes’s claim here is that corporeal traces are not enough for 
remembering: the corporeal movement is the same in both perception and 
recollection, since there “cannot be any corporeal trace of” novelty or recurrence. 
Therefore, an intellectual memory is needed that can identify thoughts as instances of 
either perception or remembering.54 
One possible way of interpreting intellectual memory is to identify it with the 
mind’s ability to access innate ideas.55 This reading is supported by Descartes’s claim 
that the thoughts of infants are about corporeal sensations, and therefore infants 
cannot contemplate God or metaphysical issues.56 What the infant lacks is reflexive 
consciousness, identified in the above-cited letter to Arnauld with intellectual 
memory.57 That is, if the infant’s thoughts are different from an adult’s because she 
lacks intellectual memory, and as a consequence she cannot contemplate God – which 
is the contemplation of an innate idea – then intellectual memory is the recollection of 
innate ideas. In the Principles of Philosophy, however, Descartes identifies the difference 
between infant thoughts and grown-up thoughts as the difference between judging the 
thought to be about something outside the subject or not.58  
From these claims we can conclude (without aiming to provide a 
comprehensive interpretation of Descartes’s theory of intellectual memory) that 
intellectual memory is a capacity of the mind that (a) is independent of the state of the 
body, (b) identifies thoughts as new or past occurrences, and (c) is able to give 
thoughts meaning beyond what is represented in the corporeal movement. For 
example, the feeling of bodily pain acquires additional meaning when it is understood 
to be caused by a particular external object. 
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4. Comparison of Descartes’s and Spinoza’s theories of memory 
Although Descartes distinguished between corporeal and intellectual memory, 
the ways in which Spinoza built upon his account is evident. Both Descartes and 
Spinoza claim that memory traces remain after an experience and that these traces 
dispose the body to being affected in a certain way. Both consider this ability to 
acquire memory traces to be a source of error, because the traces remain the same 
while states of affairs change, and because their scope is limited by the flexibility of 
the brain’s matter. Both also claim that memories are ways in which particular bodily 
movements and the corresponding ideas are associated with other bodily movements 
and their corresponding ideas. 
As we have seen, on Descartes’s account there are two constraints on the 
working of these associations. One concerns the body’s ability to work 
independently59 of the mind, the other the mind’s ability to work independently of the 
body. First, the movement of animal spirits through the memory traces is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for forming a recollected idea in the mind. When the 
pineal gland “searches” for the right memory, the animal spirits move through the 
different memory traces without the corresponding memories being recalled. Second, 
an intellectual memory is required in order to identify the memory as memory: novelty 
is a purely intellectual property, and so when the mind perceives the movement of 
animal spirits and an idea is formed, the mind is not able on that basis alone to 
determine whether it is a new perception or a memory that it experiences. 
Unlike Descartes, however, Spinoza is not a dualist,60 and therefore cannot 
admit either of these constraints as they stand. At the same time, in responding to 
Descartes, he has to account for the two phenomena of corporeal and intellectual 
memory that Descartes described. Therefore, I propose to approach Spinoza’s 
account of memory with the expectation that we will find an account that has 
different solutions for the different problems of corporeal and intellectual memories, 
even if both solutions are formulated in the context of a monist metaphysics rather 
than a dualist one. 
As we have just seen, the fact that Spinoza intends to account for the 
phenomena described by Descartes as corporeal memory is evident from E2p18d, 
which repeats the Cartesian physiological theory of corporeal memory in its outlines. 
That Spinoza intends to account for the phenomena described by Descartes as 
intellect and intellectual memory is indicated by the fact that the examples mentioned 
in the scholium of E2p18 both come from Descartes’s description of intellectual 
memory. In order to show their similarities and differences, I quote both of them 
extensively. The first example in Spinoza is the following: 
 
And from this we clearly understand why the mind, from the thought 
of one thing, immediately passes to the thought of another, which 
has no likeness to the first: as, for example, from the thought of the 
word pomum a Roman will immediately pass to the thought of the 
fruit [viz., an apple], which has no similarity to that articulate sound 
and nothing in common with it except that the body of the same man 
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has often been affected by these two [NS: at the same time], that is, 
that the man often heard the word pomum while he saw the fruit.61 
 
As I have mentioned, the same example is used by Descartes according to Burman: 
 
I do not refuse to admit intellectual memory: it does exist. When, for 
example, on hearing that the word “K-I-N-G” signifies supreme 
power, I commit this to my memory and then subsequently recall the 
meaning by means of my memory, it must be the intellectual memory 
that makes this possible. For there is certainly no relationship 
between the four letters (K-I-N-G) and their meaning, which would 
enable me to derive the meaning from the letters. It is the intellectual 
memory that enables me to recall what the letters stand for.62 
 
The second example is the following: 
 
And in this way each of us will pass from one thought to another, as 
each one’s association has ordered the images of things in the body. 
For example; a soldier, having seen traces (vestigiis) of a horse in the 
sand, will immediately pass from the thought of a horse to the 
thought of a horseman, and from that to the thought of war, and so 
on. But a farmer will pass from the thought of a horse to the thought 
of a plow, and then to that of a field, and so on. And so each one, 
according as he has been accustomed to join and connect the images 
of things in this or that way, will pass from one thought to another.63 
 
The example of traces in the sand comes up in Descartes as well: 
 
Consequently, if ever I wrote that the thoughts of children leave no 
traces (vestigia) in their brain, I meant traces sufficient for memory, 
that is, traces (vestigiis) which at the time of their impression are 
observed by pure intellect to be new. In a similar way we say that 
there are no human tracks (vestigia) in the sand if we cannot find any 
impressions shaped like a human foot, though perhaps there may be 
many unevennesses made by human feet, which can therefore in 
another sense be called human tracks (vestigia).64 
 
These examples clearly show both that Spinoza recognizes that the 
phenomena that Descartes uses as examples for his intellectual memory are something 
that he needs to account for, and that he wants to account for these phenomena 
without invoking an intellect independent of the body. In the first case, Descartes 
argues that intellectual memory is required in order to establish the connection 
between the sound of the word and its meaning because in the experience of hearing 
the word “king” there is nothing that would indicate that it means “ruler.” By 
contrast, Spinoza argues that there is no difference between, on the one hand, the 
 
 
 
Olivér István Tóth - Memory, Recollection and Consciousness in Spinoza’s Ethics 
62 
association between the perception of the word and the idea of its meaning, and, on 
the other, the association between the perception of a cat and the passion of fear, 
which Descartes accounts for in purely physiological terms.65 
In the second case, Descartes argues that intellectual memory is similarly 
required in order to interpret corporeal traces, both in the brain and in the sand. In 
the case of traces in the sand, the same shape can be interpreted either as traces of 
humans or as unevenness on the ground, and it is the intellectual memory that decides 
which one is perceived. Similarly, in the case of the brain the same bodily motion can 
be interpreted either as a new sensation or as the recollection of past experience, and 
it is intellectual memory that determines which one is being experienced. By contrast, 
Spinoza argues that this interpretative work depends on the past experiences of the 
subject. The traces in the sand in themselves are ambiguous, and different minds can 
interpret them as traces of a warhorse or of a draft horse, but in the context of the 
other ideas of a given mind it is impossible to experience them other than as they are 
experienced: the soldier cannot but see them as traces of a warhorse, even though 
there is nothing in the traces themselves that would indicate that they in fact belong to 
a warhorse. The past experience recorded in the bodies of the soldier and the farmer 
sets the tone for their new experiences, as it were. 
The implication is that traces in the brain are similarly ambiguous. Although 
there is nothing in the idea of a corporeal movement in itself that could indicate that it 
is a new perception or that it is a memory of a past occurrence, in the context of the 
other bodily images (and in the context of the corresponding ideas) it is necessarily 
interpreted in the way it is. If the image has connections to other images, the mind 
cannot but interpret it as a memory, whereas if it has no connection with other 
images, it is interpreted as a new perception. This is confirmed in Spinoza’s 
characterization of wonder and the role of E2p18 in this characterization. In the 
definition of affects he states that wonder is the imagination of a corporeal image that 
has no connection with other images, and therefore the mind remains fixed in 
imagining it (E3defaff4). In the explication of the definition, Spinoza cites E2p18, 
where he says that he has shown how ideas become associated. When an idea is 
formed for the first time it clearly lacks such an association with other ideas, and 
therefore it is not experienced as memory but as a new perception. Here, Spinoza 
echoes Descartes’s sentiment that “there cannot be any corporeal trace of [the] 
novelty [of an image].”66 From this, however, Spinoza does not conclude that the 
novelty is in the judgment of intellectual memory; he concludes instead that the 
novelty is in the connection of corporeal images, or rather in the lack thereof.67 
 
5. Spinoza’s theory of memory reconsidered 
My argument is that the above-mentioned conclusion of Spinoza reveals his 
solution to the problem presented by his monist reinterpretation of Descartes’s dualist 
metaphysics. As we have seen, Descartes is able to account for non-entertained 
memories with the help of two conceptual resources, both of which presuppose his 
dualism. On the one hand, he does not have to worry about the potential implications 
of a preservationist-leaning approach as long as the actual representations are merely 
brain states and not mental states. As the “cerebral search engine” metaphor suggests, 
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the pineal gland can “search” in the images retained in the brain without the mind 
forming the corresponding ideas. Similarly, in cases where the interpretation of 
ambiguous representations (i.e., traces) is needed – as in the case of novelty and 
attributing sensations to external objects – Descartes can have recourse to intellectual 
memory, which is an ability of the mind that is independent of the body. 
I claim that none of these conceptual resources are available for Spinoza 
because his monist metaphysics does not allow for either the working of the body 
independent of the mind, or for the working of the mind independent of the body. 
That he is aware of these consequences of his monism is clear from the polemical way 
in which he uses Descartes’s examples. By using the very same examples that 
Descartes used to argue for intellectual memory, Spinoza argues that he can account 
for both the retention of non-entertained memories and for the interpretation of 
ambiguous representations without violating his commitment to the strict 
isomorphism of mind and body. 
Concerning the problem of non-entertained memories, Spinoza takes a 
generationist approach, which he describes as the ordering of images. That is, when 
the body is affected in a specific way a specific memory is recollected (for example, 
traces of a horse bring up the memory of a battlefield). This ordering of images is 
clearly a disposition or ability, which supports Renz’s claim that a wholesale rejection 
of dispositions is not a viable interpretation of Spinoza.68 However, as we have seen in 
section 2, this approach has to account for the actual properties that ground this 
disposition. In this case, these actual properties are the parts that constitute the body. 
The problem analogous to the pancreas problem is solved in the following way: since 
humans are normally conscious of their bodies, the actual properties that ground the 
disposition for generating memories are conscious. In contrast, non-entertained 
memories are not conscious because they are not actual properties: they are generated 
only at the appropriate moment. And there is a good reason why the dispositions are 
not conscious themselves: they are not actual properties themselves, but rather are 
relations between properties.69 
Let me explain what I mean by using the analogy of a machine. A machine 
has parts that remain numerically the same all the time; some of its functions, 
however, are carried out only when these parts have a particular connection. For 
example, when some gears touch other gears, the gears remain the same and they 
always have a relationship – namely, being in a position that allows them to touch 
each other when slid – but they do not always move. If the machine had 
consciousness,70 it would be conscious of its parts and the workings of its parts all the 
time. It would not, however, be conscious of the connection of its gears – for 
example, the fact that they are in a position that allows them to touch each other when 
slid – but when they slide and start moving the machine becomes aware of this 
movement. Analogously, the parts of the body and their workings are always 
conscious in the mind, but the fact that the parts of the body have certain connections 
(e.g., nerves in the brain tissue can open when other nerves open as well) is not 
something we are conscious of. In this way the non-entertained memory is a 
connection of parts of the body that is not conscious. The memory becomes 
conscious when, for example, the nerves actually open and this movement is 
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perceived by the mind. In this way, what grounds the disposition can be conscious 
without the disposition itself being so. 
However, this raises the second question: How does the mind distinguish 
between perceptions and recalled memories? As I have argued, the Cartesian answer 
that it is identified by intellectual memory is not available. Rather, Spinoza solves the 
problem in the same way, namely, by relying on the connections between actual 
properties. As we have seen, Spinoza’s answer is that images that lack connections are 
experienced as new perceptions, whereas images that are connected with other images 
are experienced as memories. This is a solution that fits well into the overall Cartesian 
project, given what Descartes says at the end of his Meditations: 
 
For I now notice that there is a vast difference between the two [i.e., 
between waking experience and dreaming], in that dreams are never 
linked by memory with all the other actions of life as waking 
experiences are. If, while I am awake, anyone were suddenly to 
appear to me and then disappear immediately, as happens in sleep, so 
that I could not see where he had come from or where he had gone 
to, it would not be unreasonable for me to judge that he was a ghost, 
or a vision created in my brain, rather than a real man.71 
 
Here, Descartes states that by the connection between elements of experience 
the subject can decide whether such an idea comes from experience or is part of a 
dream or hallucination. Spinoza, however turns the relationship around: while for 
Descartes it is (intellectual) memory that tests the connections and distinguishes 
between perception and hallucination, for Spinoza it is the connection of ideas that 
constitutes the mind experiencing an idea either as perception or as memory.72 The 
mind acquires a new, non-entertained memory when such a connection is formed, and 
when the mind forms an idea because the connected idea is entertained it remembers 
the memory. However, when the mind forms the idea either because of some external 
cause or because an idea is entertained to which it has no previous connection, the 
idea is experienced as a new perception. 
This solution also solves a difficulty in the Cartesian account, namely, the fact 
that it does not make it clear how intellectual memory can fail. Descartes gives ample 
description of how corporeal memory can fail: physical traces in the brain can fail to 
materialize,73 these physical traces can be deformed beyond recognition,74 the 
intellectual memory might fail to recognize them as traces of memory,75 or perhaps 
the pineal gland will fail to “find” the appropriate traces. But there is another way in 
which the intellectual memory can fail. In Descartes’s example a poet might have good 
enough traces in his brain to recollect a whole line, but his intellectual memory does 
not allow for him to realize that he is remembering this line and that it was not 
invented by him.76 At this point, it is unclear how this is possible, given that 
intellectual memory does not rely on material traces.77 Spinoza can solve this problem: 
given that the mind’s ability to recognize a token memory as memory depends on the 
connection of actual mental properties, which are isomorphic to physical properties, 
and given that physical properties are at the mercy of physical causes and can change 
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in many ways, this identification can easily fail. When the connections fail to be 
established or are malfunctioning, the mind can experience the recollection of a past 
occurrence as a new perception. 
This is a modified generationist picture that benefits from the appreciation of 
the Cartesian distinction between corporeal and intellectual memory, and therefore 
does not face the problems discussed in section 2 above. This account preserves the 
advantage of the generationist view in that it does not postulate actual representations 
in the brain, and therefore does not have to explain why the mind is not constantly 
aware of memories that are not entertained. Non-entertained memories are abilities of 
the mind to form particular ideas, which are its entertained memories. On the other 
hand, this account can explain what grounds this ability of the mind. The ability is 
grounded in the connections among the parts of the body. 
This account also provides an explanation of those texts where Spinoza 
sounds preservationist: non-entertained memories are preserved – not, however, as 
actual properties of the body, but as connections between parts of the body. That is, 
we should conceive of memory traces in Spinoza not as like a physical shape left by a 
seal in wax, but as like the relationship between gears in a machine. When an external 
cause – a technician, for example – modifies the machine slightly, some of the gears 
move to a different position in the machine and thereby receive the ability to move in 
a slightly different way. This new ability, however, can result in totally new functions 
of the machine. Similarly, an external cause – for instance, the new perception of a 
warhorse – modifies the constitution of the human body slightly, and the body 
thereby receives the ability to react to external stimuli slightly differently – for 
instance, by recalling the image of a warhorse instead of a draft horse. This new 
ability, however, can result in a totally new function of the body – for instance, 
recalling the image of a warhorse every time the subject sees traces of a horse. 
To sum up, I argue that interpreting non-entertained memories as the 
connections (which are not consciously perceived) between parts of the body (which 
are consciously perceived) can account for Spinoza’s uses of memory, which are 
mostly related to the association of ideas and his theory of affects. Spinoza accepts the 
Cartesian description of corporeal memory, but with a twist. Like Descartes, he 
accepts that non-entertained memories are stored in the brain as memory traces. 
Contrary to Descartes, however, he holds that these traces are connections of parts of 
the body and not actual beings. He accepts the Cartesian description of intellectual 
memory with a similar twist. Like Descartes, he accepts that particular instances of 
memories do not have features that identify them as memories. Contrary to Descartes, 
however, he does not accept that memories are identified by an intellectual memory as 
instances of memory; rather, they are identified by the context in which they are 
recalled, i.e., by the connections they have to other ideas. 
 
6. Conclusion 
At the beginning of this paper, I raised the question: Given the significant role 
that memory plays both in Spinoza’s theoretical philosophy and in his practical 
philosophy, what does his theory of memory actually look like? I have shown that 
although there is textual evidence both for a preservationist and a for generationist 
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account, neither is compatible with Spinoza’s other philosophical commitments. On 
the one hand, the generationist view presupposes dispositions, which fit uneasily into 
Spinoza’s metaphysical picture. On the other hand, both the generationist and the 
preservationist views presuppose the retention of some bodily properties. In the case 
of the preservationist view, these properties are memory traces that represent past 
occurrences, whereas in the case of the generationist view, these properties ground the 
disposition of the mind to generate representations of past occurrences. The problem 
is that on Spinoza’s theory of consciousness the mind is conscious of everything that 
happens in the body (known in the literature as the “pancreas problem”). Yet the 
same problem can be raised concerning these actual properties of the body: Why is 
the mind not aware of its properties all the time? 
By comparing Descartes’s account of memory to Spinoza’s, I have shown 
that it is clear that Spinoza formulated his account of memory as a reaction to 
Descartes’s theory. More specifically, he chose the examples with which he illustrated 
his account of memory in order to highlight the differences between his own theory 
and Descartes’s. In both cases, Descartes accounts for the phenomenon discussed in 
the examples by appeal to intellectual memory (i.e., memory independent of the body). 
In contrast, Spinoza accounts for both cases by appeal to a memory that is both 
corporeal and mental. 
On this basis, I have argued for a revised generationist interpretation of 
Spinoza’s account of memory, according to which the body is the actual physical 
grounding for the mind’s ability to form representations of past occurrences, and the 
connections that this generated representation has to other representations ensures 
that the mind perceives it as a memory and not as a new experience. This 
interpretation has the advantage over earlier views that it does not face the problem 
analogous to the pancreas problem, since the physical grounding for the disposition of 
memory is conscious. At the same time, it does not go against everyday experience, 
since memories, as dispositions, are not conscious all the time. 
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